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SEC RULE 3b-9 STRUCK DOWN AS IN
CONFLICT WITH THE EXCHANGE ACT:
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION v. SEC
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 which created the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"),2
gave that Commission broad authority over securities transactions
and the persons who engage in them.' Among those subject to the
I Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982
& Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. The Exchange Act was passed "to provide
for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets operating in in-
terstate and foreign commerce... to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such ex-
changes and markets, and for other purposes." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURrIEs ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934 Item 18 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar comp. 1973) [hereinafter LEGIS-
LATmE HISTORY]; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (purpose of
Exchange Act is to protect investors). The bill that eventually became the Exchange Act
was introduced into Congress after thorough congressional investigations had detailed the
abuses that were taking place in the securities markets. See 1 L. Loss, SECURrrIEs REGULA-
TION, 119-21 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969); Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1036 n.22 (1934); Article, The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 23 CAIF. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1934). For a good discussion of the principal "evils" that
were found to exist in stock exchanges-short selling, margin trading, and manipula-
tion-see Tracy & MacChesney, supra, at 1027-33.
Despite the fact that various reforms had been proposed as a result of earlier investiga-
tions of exchange practices, no concrete federal action was taken until the 1930's. See id. at
1033-36. The stock market crash of 1929 and the depression that followed "brought the long
movement for federal securities regulation to a head." See 1 L. Loss, supra, at 120-21. While
securities regulation existed at the state level for more than 80 years before the federal
government finally stepped into the picture, state regulation had ultimately proved to be an
inadequate means of dealing with the problems prevalent within the securities markets. See
generally id. at 23-107 (overview of state laws and their provisions).
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1982). The Exchange Act created the Securities and Exchange
Commission [hereinafter SEC or Commission] and provided that it be composed of five
commissioners appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation. See id. In addi-
tion, commissioners were not allowed to hold any other employment or engage in any
outside business. See id.
3 The Exchange Act granted the SEC authority to regulate the securities field in a com-
prehensive manner. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1982) (regulation of national securities ex-
changes); § 78i (1982) (control of price manipulation); § 78k (1982 & Supp. II 1985) (regula-
tion of trading by exchange members, brokers, and dealers); § 78o (1982 & Supp. III 1985)
(broker and dealer regulation); § 78p (1982) (regulation of corporate directors, officers, and
stockholders); § 78u (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (investigations and court actions). See gener-
ally Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 1, at 1037-68 (analyzing various sections of Exchange
Act and discussing attempts to deal with market abuse).
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SEC's authority are any persons who are securities brokers or se-
curities dealers,4 categories for which the SEC has implemented
extensive regulations.5 Banks, whose activities in the securities
business are restricted by other legislation,' are specifically ex-
While the scope of the original Exchange Act was sweeping, subsequent amendments
have granted the SEC additional powers. See, e.g., Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in scattered portions of 15 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter 1975 Amendments]; see also Greenberg, Banks and the Federal Securities
Laws: Some Recent Developments, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 665, 675-93 (1976) (discussing amend-
ments and their effect on SEC's powers); Note, Legislation: Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 462, 462-75 (1976) (same). Moreover, the SEC administers several
statutes in addition to the Exchange Act. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 38-42 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o to 78o-4 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). As defined in the Exchange
Act, "broker" refers to "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in se-
curities for the account of others, but does not include a bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982)
(emphasis added). A "dealer" is defined as "any person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not in-
clude a bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1982) (emphasis added). The definition of "person"
within the Exchange Act includes "a natural person, company, government, or political sub-
division, agency, or instrumentality of a government." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1982).
1 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.0-1 to .31-1 (1986). The bulk of the regulatory scheme promul-
gated by the SEC under the Exchange Act encompasses the rights and duties of securities
brokers and dealers, and is extraordinarily complex. See id.; see also S. JAFFE, BROKER-
DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS, A GUIDE TO THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1977 & Supp.
1986) (manual on law governing broker-dealers); Securities Indus. Ass'n, Public Policy Is-
sues Raised by Bank Securities Activities, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 339, 358-59 (1983) (men-
tioning regulatory requirements imposed on broker-dealers). In addition, the SEC has spe-
cifically provided that any rule or regulation issued under the Exchange Act which prohibits
practices involving the use of the mails or interstate commerce is applicable to any regis-
tered broker or dealer, whether or not the mails or interstate commerce are involved. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.0-8 (1986).
1 See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter Glass-Steagall Act].
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in the wake of the financial collapse of the late
1920's-early 1930's in order to effect a partial separation between the commercial and in-
vestment banking fields. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61-62 (1981); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629-30 (1971);
Pitt & Williams, The Glass-Steagall Act: Key Issues for the Financial Services Industry,
11 SEC. REG. L.J. 234, 235-40 (1983); Note, Regulation of State Nonmember Insured Banks'
Securities Activities: A Model for the Repeal of Glass-Steagall?, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211,
211-16 (1986). Congress sought to avoid the "hazards" it believed might occur if commercial
banks exceeded the scope of their "fiduciary or managing agent" roles and were exposed to
the "temptations" of investment banking. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 629-34.
The designation "Glass-Steagall Act," though often applied to the entire Banking Act,
is properly used to refer to only four sections of the statute: sections 16, 20, 21, and 32. 12
U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh), 377, 378, and 78 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Note, supra, at 211
n.1. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act prevents a national bank from directly engaging in
certain securities activities, including underwriting and purchasing securities "for its own
account." See 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (Supp. III 1985). Section 20 prohibits member banks,
that is, banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System, see 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1982),
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empted from the Exchange Act's definitions of "broker" and
"dealer."'1 As a result of recent, less restrictive interpretations of
the banking legislation,8 banks have become increasingly involved
in the securities business.9 In response, the SEC promulgated Rule
from affiliating with organizations "engaged principally" in securities transactions. See 12
U.S.C. § 377 (1982). Section 21 bars organizations "engaged in" the securities business from
undertaking banking activities, thus approaching the section 16 restrictions from the oppo-
site angle. See 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982). Finally, section 32 precludes individuals in the securi-
ties business from working simultaneously in the banking industry, subject to limited excep-
tions. See 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
' See supra note 4 ("broker" and "dealer" defined). The Exchange Act defines a
"bank" as a "banking institution organized under" federal law, a bank that is a member of
the Federal Reserve System, or "any other banking institution ... doing business under the
laws of any State or of the United States," which, as a significant part of its business, re-
ceives deposits or exercises fiduciary powers similar to those of national banks. See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1982).
8 In the 1970's, bank regulatory authorities began construing the Glass-Steagall Act as
permitting bank affiliation with subsidiary companies engaged in various aspects of the se-
curities business; these administrative decisions were generally upheld by the courts. See
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 209,
216-21 (1984) (upholding Board determination that bank holding company acquisition of
discount brokerage company did not violate Glass-Steagall); Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC,
606 F. Supp. 683, 684-86 (D.D.C. 1985) (sustaining FDIC regulations permitting state non-
member bank ownership of affiliates and subsidiaries in securities business); New York
Stock Exchange v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-1101 (D.D.C. 1975) (upholding Comptrol-
ler's opinion that national banks may purchase securities for customers on a "continuous
and widespread basis"), vacated on other grounds sub nom. New York Stock Exchange v.
Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); see also FDIC Gen.
Couns. Op. No. 6, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,989, 22,990-91 (1983) (nonmember bank may directly
offer and advertise discount brokerage services). But see Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401
U.S. 617, 619-20 (1971) (striking down, as violative of Glass-Steagall Act, Comptroller's reg-
ulation authorizing national bank sale of interests in bank-established investment fund).
These interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act by the regulatory agencies reflected a
more relaxed approach by those agencies towards increased bank participation in the securi-
ties business. See Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller's
New Reading of the Glass-Steagall Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 1303, 1312-22 (1983). An early opin-
ion by the Comptroller of the Currency construed section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act as
limiting banks to handling securities transactions only on order and for the account of cus-
tomers whose relationship with the bank existed independently of the particular securities
transactions. See Ruling of the Comptroller, Treas. Dep't Bull. (Oct. 27, 1936), quoted in 4
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 49,202, at 28,207 (Nov. 4, 1983). Moreover, the bank was
prohibited from making a profit on the transaction by collecting a commission. See id. The
Comptroller subsequently authorized the receipt of "compensation" by the transacting
bank. See Digest of Op. of the Comptroller, 220 (Apr. 1, 1960), quoted in 4 Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) T 49,202, at 28,206 (Nov. 4, 1983).
1 See Peters & Powers, Functional Regulation: Looking Ahead, 18 Loy. LAL. REv.
1075, 1082-83 (1985); Securities Indus. Ass'n, supra note 5, at 339-40, 347-52; Note, A
Banker's Adventures in Brokerland: Looking Through Glass-Steagall at Discount Broker-
age Services, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1498, 1498-1501 (1983). In 1985, the SEC believed that at
least one thousand banks were engaged in the active promotion of brokerage services to the
public, receiving in return for these services a portion of the commissions paid by the cus-
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3b-9, which attempted to regulate banks engaged in certain securi-
ties activities. 10 This rule effectively subjected any bank which re-
ceived "transaction-related compensation" for brokerage services
to the SEC's broker-dealer regulations if the bank in question ei-
ther "publicly solicited" the brokerage customer or performed the
service for an account to which it also provided advice.11 Recently,
in American Bankers Association v. SEC, 2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held Rule
3b-9 invalid as an attempt by the SEC to expand its own authority
beyond the limits expressly set by the Exchange Act. s
In American Bankers, the American Bankers Association in-
stituted an action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that Rule 3b-9
was invalid and an injunction prohibiting SEC enforcement of the
rule against members of the plaintiff-association. 14 The district
tomer to the entity actually executing the securities transaction. See Adoption of Rule 3b-9,
50 Fed. Reg. 28,385, 28,393 (1985).
" See Adoption of Rule 3b-9, supra note 9, at 28,386-87; see also 48 Fed. Reg. 51,930,
51,931-32 (1983) (SEC discussion of proposed Rule 3b-9's effect on expanded bank involve-
ment in securities business). Rule 3b-9 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The term "bank" as used in the definition of "broker" and "dealer" in
section 3(a)(4) and (5) of the Act [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5)] does not include a
bank that:
(1) Publicly solicits brokerage business for which it receives transac-
tion-related compensation....
(2) Directly or indirectly receives transaction-related compensation
for providing brokerage services for trust, managing agency or other ac-
counts to which the bank provides advice....
(3) Deals in or underwrites securities.
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1986) [hereinafter Rule 3b-9]. The rule exempts from its coverage
several designated securities transactions that may be engaged in by banks, as well as situa-
tions where brokerage services are offered, by a bank, through "a broker-dealer registered
under the [Exchange] Act." See Rule 3b-9(a), (b). The effect of Rule 3b-9 is to bring banks
under the coverage of the rules and regulations governing broker-dealers. See Adoption of
Rule 3b-9, supra note 9, at 28,388; see generally supra note 5 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing broker-dealer rules and regulations).
" See Rule 3b-9(a)(1), (2), supra note 10; Adoption of Rule 3b-9, supra note 9, at
28,388-91. In adopting Rule 3b-9, the SEC noted several examples of situations where "a
disparity in the regulation of functionally equivalent activities performed by banks and bro-
ker-dealers" existed. See Adoption of Rule 3b-9, supra note 9, at 28,387. Broker-dealers
engaging in securities activities were subjected to heavier regulatory burdens in areas such
as examination requirements, employee supervision responsibilites, and advertising guide-
lines. See id. at 28,387-88. However, the SEC explicitly avoided taking a position on the
legality of bank brokerage activities when it promulgated Rule 3b-9. See id. at 28,386 n.3.
12 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
" See id. at 755.
" See id. at 740. "The American Bankers Association is a national trade association of
SEC RULE 3b-9
court, holding that Exchange Act section 3(a)'s "context" clause as
well as section 3(b) of that Act empowered the SEC to issue Rule
3b-9 notwithstanding the rule's contradiction of express statutory
definitions, granted summary judgment for the SEC and dismissed
the complaint.15
On appeal, the circuit court reversed.16 Writing for a unani-
mous court, Chief Judge Wald analyzed the language and legisla-
tive history of both the original 1934 Exchange Act and its 1975
amendments, as well as some relevant case law.17 Based on this
analysis, the court concluded that Rule 3b-9 was an invalid at-
tempt by the SEC to expand its own jurisdiction in violation of
explicit statutory language and the congressional intent that this
language expressed."8 The court reasoned that the "context" clause
and section 3(b), which the district court had utilized to uphold
Rule 3b-9, did not provide the SEC with the authority to alter
terms expressly defined in the Exchange Act. 9
While the court's invalidation of Rule 3b-9 appears to be cor-
rect and in conformity with the language of the Exchange Act, the
statutory analysis used to reach this result was flawed in its failure
to more thoroughly address the "context" clause and section 3(b),
the statutory bases upon which the SEC and the lower court had
depended to sustain this rule. Specifically, it would have been pref-
erable for the court of appeals to compare those provisions to other
relevant Exchange Act sections in order to refute the argument
that the SEC had authority to promulgate Rule 3b-9 and thereby
redefine statutory terms. This Comment will examine the Ex-
change Act provisions relied upon by the SEC and the lower court,
the commercial banking industry, representing over 12,000 commercial banks in the United
States." Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant at i, American Bankers, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (No. 85-6055).
" See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 740, 743. The two provisions at issue were the
Exchange Act section 3(a)'s opening phrase, which states that the definitions contained
within that section are to apply "unless the context otherwise requires," see 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a) (1982); and Exchange Act section 3(b), which gives the SEC authority to define
"terms used in this" statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1982); American Bankers, 804 F.2d at
753; infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
11 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 740.
'7 See id. at 743-55.
See id. at 740, 755.
x' See id. at 753-55. For discussion of these statutory provisions, see supra note 15 and
accompanying text; infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text; Adoption of Rule 3b-9, supra
note 9, at 28,392; Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 39-44, 50-52, Ameri-
can Bankers, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 85-6055).
1986]
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and will contrast the language contained therein with language
used in other Exchange Act sections where Congress did, in fact,
explicitly allow the SEC to alter statutory requirements.
THE CLAIMED STATUTORY BASIS FOR RULE 3b-9
The two statutory provisions which the SEC claimed provided
it with the authority to modify Exchange Act definitions are both
contained in the Exchange Act's definitional section. The SEC's
principal statutory argument was premised on the "context" clause
which qualifies all the definitions contained in section 3(a) by stat-
ing that the meaning of a specific term is as provided in the stat-
ute, "unless the context otherwise requires."20 The SEC contended
that the "context" referred to in section 3(a) is the "factual" con-
text which exists outside the statute.2 The other statutory provi-
sion relied on was section 3(b), which authorizes the SEC "to de-
fine technical, trade, accounting, and other terms used in" the
Exchange Act.22 The SEC argued that this provision empowered
the Commission to redefine terms already defined in the Exchange
Act.23 Although the American Bankers court rejected the SEC's
construction of both statutory provisions,24 it is submitted that,
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In discussing the statutory basis
upon which it relied in promulgating Rule 3b-9, the SEC emphasized the fact that bank
involvement in securities activities had expanded significantly in the period since 1934 when
Congress adopted the bank exclusion in the "broker" and "dealer" definitions. See Adoption
of Rule 3b-9, supra note 9, at 28,392-93; see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text
(discussing increase in bank brokerage activities).
The Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stdt. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter Securities Act] has the same clause
in its definitional section. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982).
21 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 753; infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1982) (emphasis added). The Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, a banking regulatory authority, is given similar authority in section
3(b). See id. The Board is granted certain powers by other provisions of the Exchange Act.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (authority to set margin requirements);
§ 78h (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (authority over borrowing).
22 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 755-56; Adoption of Rule 3b-9, supra note 9, at
28,392 n.61; infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
24 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 753-55. Chief Judge Wald did not consider the
SEC's arguments regarding these two provisions until near the end of the American Bank-
ers opinion. See id. Since, however, the SEC placed particular emphasis on the "context"
clause and section 3(b), the lower court specifically relied on those two provisions as a basis
for its decision, and an affirmance of the SEC's interpretation of either provision would have
had the effect of sustaining the Commission's authority to redefine statutory terms, it is
submitted that the consideration of these two statutory provisions was the most significant
aspect of the court's analysis, and that a larger portion of the opinion should have been
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while this conclusion was proper, it was reached by means of an
analysis that was neither compelling nor complete.
"FACTUAL CONTEXT" VS. "TEXTUAL CONTEXT"
In rejecting the SEC's "context" clause argument, the Ameri-
can Bankers court endorsed the view that this clause refers only to
the context in which a particular defined term is used within the
statute itself, that is, the "textual context," rather than to an ex-
ternal "factual context. '2 5 To buttress this position, the court at-
tempted to distinguish a case relied on by the SEC, Marine Bank
v. Weaver,2 which dealt with the definition of "security" in the
Exchange Act.2 7 A careful reading of Marine Bank shows, however,
that the Supreme Court's acceptance in that case of the "factual
devoted to such issues.
2' See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 753-54. The circuits are divided on the issue of
whether the "context" clause in the Exchange Act (or the clause's Securities Act counter-
part) refers to the factual context or to the textual context. For support of the "factual
context" position, see Emisco Indus. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38, 39-41 (7th Cir. 1976); Ex-
change Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976);
C.N.S. Enter. v. G. & G. Enter., 508 F.2d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975). For support of the "textual context" viewpoint, see Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737
F.2d 320, 330-32 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985); see
also 4 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2485 (Supp. 1969) (assuming clause refers to "textual
context").
The Supreme Court has adopted a "factual context" approach in determining whether
particular transactions are within the definition of "security" as found in the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982), or in the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982), but has
generally applied this approach without even discussing the "context" clause contained in
either statute. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-58 (1975); SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 69-73 (1959); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 297-301 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-52, 355
(1943). But see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-60 (1982) (using "factual context"
and relying in part on "context" clause), discussed infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the Court, when considering other definitions in the securities laws, has stated
the issue in terms of the textual context in which the terms appear but nevertheless has
analyzed the factual context of the transaction in question. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 464-69 (1969) (interpreting "the words 'purchase or sale' in the context of
section 10(b)" of the Exchange Act). The Court's position on the "factual context" versus
"textual context" dispute, while apparently favoring the former view, is thus not entirely
clear.
26 455 U.S. 551 (1982); see Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 41-44,
American Bankers, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 85-6055); Adoption of Rule 3b-9,
supra note 9, at 28,393.
27 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 753 & nn.23-24; Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 555-
61. The issue in Marine Bank was "whether... a conventional certificate of deposit and a
business agreement... could be considered securities under the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws." Marine Bank, 445 U.S. at 552.
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context" argument was not "unnecessary to the Court's holding,"
as the American Bankers court asserted,28 since the Court actually
utilized the "factual context" of the transaction in question to re-
solve the issue involved.29
After pointing out what it perceived as additional shortcom-
ings of the "factual context" position,30 the American Bankers
court qualified its rejection of that position by indicating that an
examination of the "factual context" might be appropriate in other
20 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 753 (footnote omitted).
20 See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 555-61. As Marine Bank resolved the issue of whether
particular transactions were "securities" under the securities laws by analyzing the circum-
stances of those transactions, it is related to the line of Supreme Court cases which used a
"factual context" analysis to decide whether an instrument or transaction is a "security"
without relying on the "context" clause. See supra note 25. It differs from those cases, how-
ever, in that the Court in Marine Bank twice mentioned the "context" clause as one of the
bases of support for its analysis, and assumed without discussing the point that the clause
referred to the factual context surrounding a transaction. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at
555-61. To assert, then, that Marine Bank's mention of the "context" clause was simply
"unnecessary to the Court's holding" seems to indicate a less than full consideration of all
aspects of the Marine Bank opinion.
20 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 754. The court pointed to the difficulty of deter-
mining when a factual situation would require "deviation from the statutory definition,"
and also noted that Congress ultimately adopted the "context" clause contained in the Se-
curities Act (which is almost identical to the "context" clause incorporated into the Ex-
change Act one year later) rather than a Senate-approved version that referred instead to
the "text" but made no mention of this change in the Conference Report. See id. Compare
S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1933) (Senate version-"unless the text otherwise indi-
cates"), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at Item 28 with H.R. 5480, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1933) (House version--"context" clause), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at Item 26 and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24
(1933) (discussing definitional change with no mention of "text" deletion), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at Item 19. This legislative history led the court to infer
that the change was not significant. See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 754.
The court, in rejecting the "factual context" approach, seemed to accept the SEC's as-
sumption that use of that approach allows a modification in statutory definitions when the
"context" seems to warrant. See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 753-54; supra notes 20-21
and accompanying text. This assumption, however, appears to be a misstatement of the
"factual context" approach. Cases interpreting the "context" clause as referring to "factual
context" have focused on whether a particular transaction or instrument was intended to be
covered by the securities laws enacted, not on whether a changing context meant that statu-
tory definitions themselves could be modified. See Emisco Indus. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38,
39-41 (7th Cir. 1976); Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126,
1137-39 (2d Cir. 1976); C.N.S. Enter. v. G. & G. Enter., 508 F.2d 1354, 1358-63 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). So applied, the "factual context" interpretation would not
authorize the SEC to amend statutory definitions by regulation. It is therefore suggested
that it was unnecessary for the court in American Bankers to enter into the "factual con-
text"/"textual context" debate in deciding whether to strike down Rule 3b-9. Moreover, the
court's failure to correct the SEC's misunderstanding of the "factual context" position fur-
ther undermined the court's analysis.
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circumstances.3 1 The court reasoned that a "factual context" anal-
ysis could not sustain Rule 3b-9 because allowing such a result
would, in effect, permit the SEC to unilaterally expand its own ju-
risdiction beyond the statutory boundaries.2
It is submitted that the American Bankers court's discussion
of whether the "factual context" or "textual context" approach
should be adopted was largely irrelevant. Discussion of this topic
should have focused simply on an examination of the applicability
of the "factual context" position to the American Bankers scena-
rio. The unique situation presented by the SEC's promulgation of
Rule 3b-9 made it unnecessary to take sides in the "factual con-
text"/"textual context" dispute, since, as the court noted, even ac-
ceptance of the "factual context" view would not support a rule
which effectively expanded statutory boundaries.
THE POWER TO DEFINE "OTHER" TERMS
The SEC contended that section 3(b) of the Exchange Act,
which empowers the Commission to define "technical, trade, ac-
counting, and other terms," conferred authority to modify statu-
tory definitions.3 3 The American Bankers court proffered several
reasons why this section did not empower the SEC to enact a rule
such as 3b-9_ 3 4 However, the court's reasoning reflected an accept-
ance of the SEC's basic position that section 3(b) permitted the
Commission to alter the statute, but rejected the extension of this
" See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 754. The court stated that even though "some
other occasion might justify interpreting a statutory definition in light of changing market
conditions," in this instance the "unambiguous language" used in the Exchange Act's defini-
tions of "broker," "dealer," and "bank" showed a congressional intent to mark off the juris-
dictional lines between the SEC and the banking authorities. See id.
s2 See id.
" See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 754-55; Brief of the Securities and Exchange
Commission at 50-52, American Bankers, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 85-6055). The
word "other" was added to section 3(b) as part of the 1975 Amendments to the Exchange
Act. See 1975 Amendments § 3(7) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b)). According to the SEC,
the phrase "other terms" was "a catch all for any needed definitions." See Adoption of Rule
3b-9, supra note 9, at 28,392 n.61. The SEC essentially argued that section 3(b) gave it the
authority to define any terms, whether already defined in the statute or not. See Brief of the
Securities and Exchange Commission at 50-51, American Bankers, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (No. 85-6055).
1 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 754-55. In the court's view, allowing the SEC to
promulgate such a rule would encroach on the jurisdiction of banking authorities, would
lead to questions as to whether the power to enact such a regulation rested with the SEC or
banking regulators, and would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Exchange Act. See
id.
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authority to the case at bar.3 5 This view of the court's analysis is
illustrated by the fact that the court, when confronted with a
statement in the Senate Report on the 1975 Amendments which
directly supported the SEC's position that the Commission had
the power to redefine statutory terms,36 merely noted that "the
SEC cannot redefine a statutory term if doing so would encroach
on the jurisdiction of" banking authorities.3
In its brief discussion of section 3(b), a section that on its face
could arguably have provided the SEC with the authority to pro-
mulgate Rule 3b-9, the court overlooked what seemed to be the
largest gap in the SEC's reasoning. Despite the broad statement
contained in the 1975 Senate Report,38 neither the original nor the
amended section 3(b) contains any language permitting the SEC to
redefine terms already defined in the statute."'
By assuming that section 3(b) conferred any authority at all
on the SEC to rewrite statutory definitions, and by failing to note
the absence of any explicit language in section 3(b) supporting
such an assumption, it is suggested that the American Bankers
31 See id. The thrust of the court's argument was that the SEC could not expand its
own jurisdiction by relying on section 3(b). See id.
30 The Senate Report on the 1975 Amendments stated that the addition of the word
"other" to section 3(b) was intended "to broaden the authority of the [SEC] and the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to make clear that they may define any terms
used in the Exchange Act, whether or not it [sic] is already defined in" the statute. See S.
REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 94, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
179, 272 (emphasis added).
37 See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 755 n.25 (emphasis added). The court also rea-
soned that since Congress, in passing the 1975 Amendments, directed the SEC to study the
"bank" exclusion from the "broker" and "dealer" definitions and to recommend any legisla-
tion the SEC thought necessary, see 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(e) (1982), it was "highly unlikely"
that the 1975 Amendments had also given the SEC authority to unilaterally change these
definitions. See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 755 n.25.
" See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 36, 48 Stat. 881, 884 (original
section 3(b)); 15 U.S.C. § 7Bc(b) (1982).
Additionally, the American Bankers court made only fleeting reference to a case which
supported a rejection of the SEC's construction of section 3(b). See American Bankers, 804
F.2d at 755. In FAIC Sec., Inc. v. FDIC, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.), Judge
(now Justice) Scalia rejected a claim that a statute authorizing the FDIC to define terms
used in various statutory sections conferred on the FDIC "power to redefine those terms"
already defined by the statute itself. See id. at 362 (emphasis in original). The FA/C court
reasoned that an authorization to redefine statutory terms would effectively repeal the origi-
nal statutory definition. See id. Judge Scalia further argued that "[t]here is obviously [no
conflict] between a statutory provision defining one term and another provision giving the
implementing agency authority to define terms-i.e., presumably those terms requiring def-
inition." Id. (emphasis added).
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court seriously undermined the effectiveness of its holding regard-
ing the SEC's position on section 3(b). The court, in essence, put
itself in the position of having to show why a statute should not be
applied as written.
THE SEC's POWER TO MODIFY STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Portions of the original Exchange Act and the 1975 Amend-
ments explicitly grant authority to the SEC to disregard or modify
particular statutory provisions. For example, while one provision of
the Exchange Act requires that securities be registered by the is-
suer,40 elsewhere in the same section the SEC is given express au-
thority to "exempt" certain securities from the requirements of the
section.41 Additionally, a separate subsection clearly authorizes the
SEC to temporarily remove securities from particular registration
requirements.42
Another explicit grant of authority to the SEC to alter statu-
tory definitions originated in the 1975 Amendments to the Ex-
change Act. As part of the amendments, a definition of "clearing
agency" was added to the statute, along with various exceptions to
that definition.43 With regard to one of these exceptions, however,
the SEC was clearly and specifically given the power to make mod-
ifications.44 Similarly, in a new section added by the 1975 Amend-
ments, an unregistered clearing agency is barred from engaging in
interstate commerce.' 5 The subdivision containing this prohibition,
however, explicitly provides that the SEC is authorized, under cer-
40 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1), (2) (1982).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(3), (h) (1982). Subdivision (g)(3) provides that the SEC "may
by rules or regulations ... exempt from this subsection any security... if the [SEC] finds
that such exemption is in the public interest." 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(3) (1982) (emphasis
added). Subdivision (h) states that the SEC "may by rules and regulations... exempt in
whole or in part any issuer or class of issuers from" various requirements of the Exchange
Act, and may further "exempt ... any officer, director, or beneficial owner of securities"
from certain requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(h) (1982) (emphasis added).
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(e) (1982). Subsection (e) states that "[nJotwithstanding the fore-
going provisions of this section, the [SEC] may by such rules and regulations as it deems
necessary" extend the time within which securities were required to be registered after the
Exchange Act first took effect. See id. (emphasis added).
43 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23) (1982).
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(B) (1982). Subparagraph (B) states that "[tihe term
'clearing agency' does not include ... (iii) any bank, broker, dealer" or other mentioned
parties meeting certain conditions, "unless the [SEC], by rule, otherwise provides as neces-
sary or appropriate." See id. (emphasis added).
,1 See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)(1) (1982).
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tain conditions, to exempt any clearing agency from the require-
ments of the section."
These three sections, as well as other Exchange Act provi-
sions,4" demonstrate quite clearly that when Congress intended to
provide the SEC with authority to modify statutory requirements,
it used much more explicit language than that utilized by the SEC
to support Rule 3b-9's validity. Accordingly, it is submitted that
the American Bankers court should have contrasted the language
employed in the aforementioned statutory provisions with that
contained in the "context" clause and section 3(b).4s Had the court
done so, its analysis would have been more persuasive and its hold-
ing that the SEC lacked statutory authority to enact Rule 3b-9
would have been greatly strengthened.
CONCLUSION
In its attempt to substantiate its authority to promulgate a
rule which effected a rewriting of statutory definitions, the SEC
relied on the "context" clause as well as on a provision that confers
upon the SEC the power to define "other" terms. The SEC as-
serted that the general language employed in those sections vested
in the Commission the power to alter statutory definitions when
the circumstances warranted. Although there are Exchange Act
sections which do empower the SEC to modify particular Ex-
change Act provisions, these sections do so in clear and unambigu-
ous language that differs markedly from the wording relied on by
the SEC in the instant case. The American Bankers court, how-
ever, neglected to examine this contrast, and limited itself instead
16 See id. This subdivision provides that "[t]he Commission, by rule or order... may
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any clearing agency ... or any class of clearing
agencies . . . from any provisions of this section . . . if the Commission" makes certain
findings. Id.
17 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78k(c) (1982) (SEC may "exempt" an exchange from require-
ments of section); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(b) (1982) (Board of Governors may set margin require-
ments "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)").
46 The American Bankers court had precedent to rely on as authority for engaging in
such a comparison; courts have performed a similar comparative analysis to determine the
reach of particular provisions of the securities laws. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 150-52 (1984) (comparing definition of
"security" in several statutes); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976)
(contrasting various sections of securities laws with Exchange Act's anti-fraud provision);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1077-81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1009 (1972) (contrasting varying definitions of "security" as well as other provisions con-
tained in several statutes).
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to a response to the SEC's arguments that failed to refuie flawed
assumptions basic to those arguments. A more effective method of
rebutting the SEC's contentions that "context" clause or section
3(b) vested the Commission with general authority to override the
statute which governs its jurisdiction, would have been to make
such a contrast.
Frederick M. Sembler
